259 316 325 651 During the last thirty or forty years, it is true, the economic situation of the Ukraine has changed considerably; three large industries have developed in the country: the sugar industry, the mining and the metal industries. And one is tempted to say that this development was due to Russian protection. But is this quite correct? Undoubtedly the protection had some influence, but not as much as one might suppose. In the first place, one must not forget that in the Ukraine there are natural conditions much more favorable to these industries than in any other part of the Russian Empire. Certainly the sugar, metal and mining interests are among those which depend on the location of their raw materials and can never start in a place where these are lacking. Besides, these industries are infinitely more fostered by transportational advantages than by custom duties. The duties which were imposed on foreign coal did not prevent the importation of English coal into the Baltic provinces nor into Petrograd. On the other hand, even if all custom duties on foreign coal had been suppressed, it would never have penetrated into central Russia and there replaced the fuel of Donetz. As to the sugar, the situation in the Ukraine was perhaps even more favorable. As to metallurgy, it no doubt profited by the protective Russian tax. But there again the role of this tax was not very great. In fact, the products of Ukrainian metallurgy were heavy (rails, beams, tires, wheels, pipes, iron bars, etc.), and their manufacture was only slightly stimulated by the tax because of the great distances over which they had, in any case, to be carried. Protective tariff is much more necessary to those industries which supply finished products of light weight, but of these the Ukraine furnished very few. The textile industry of Moscow and of Poland profited much more by protection, as did many other branches of the industrial activities of central Russia.

Effect of Russian Imperial Methods in Ukraine

369 241 Therefore, by this system, the Ukraine had more loss than profit. She was still a market for Russian and Polish industrial products, for which she paid high prices. But

from Ukraine, although it is true that Russia had to be supplied with sugar in addition to raw and auxiliary materials (coal, ores, pig-iron, steel etc.). Imports to Ukraine (e. g. textiles) were more than met by exports. But no capital was imported from Russia to set off the active trade balance; this came almost entirely from other countries. 439

In the common budget of Imperial Russia in the years 1909—1913 Ukraine had to supply 20 % of the total revenue while it was allocated only 20 % of the expenditure. Almost half (45—46 %) of the Imperial revenue from Dnipro Ukraine was diverted to other areas of Russia. Three fourths of the funds ear-marked for capitalisation went abroad in the form of interest and dividends; Russia itself utilised revenue from Ukraine to install rival plants that very often manufactured or finished goods derived from Ukraine. Ukraine exported abroad four to nine times as much as she imported and was solely responsible for the fact that Russia had an active trade balance. It is an undisputable fact that Ukraine was an integral part of the economic system of Europe before the First World War. 651 439

7. **The Russian Eurasian Theory**

is that all Eurasian and Asiatic parts of Russia, including peripheral areas like Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan etc. must be united in one great empire. Let us view this problem from the point of view of economic geography. 000

The features common to that gigantic stretch of territory are the enormous distances between the various centers of production to the frontiers and the sea, the length of time that rivers and seas are ice-bound, sparse population, high costs of transportation, and an unfavorable position with regard to world markets. It must therefore be organised as a self-supporting economy, planned from some center. Western Siberia is the heart of Eurasia.

These facts do not apply to Ukraine. The 2400 km between the sea and the Semyrjechka area may be Eurasian, while in Europe the least favorable points are less than 600 km from the sea, and this "European" distance from the sea holds for Ukraine where no center is further than 600 km from the Black Sea. The distance between the Kusnets Basin, the chief coal area of 131 487

423 The natural result was the growing depopulation of the cities.
369 Peasants who had gone into industry now flowed back to their native villages and demanded their share of the land in the hope that they might be able to raise food for themselves and their families. This increased the already overcrowded rural population and intensified the bitterness that was felt among all classes.

The hatred thus aroused was increased by the formation of committees of poor and landless peasants to take over the estates. Yet in Ukraine there was an important sector of the population who had been the owners and proprietors of from two to nearly one hundred acres of land. In some districts these included nearly a quarter of the peasant families and in an attempt to propitiate them the Soviets were frequently inclined to favor them and allow them to retain their holdings instead of dividing them among the more idle and shiftless of the population.

● 651 Yet this did not serve to maintain agricultural production[1] for
661 the crying demand of Moscow was for food. The Communists had abolished all markets and taxes but they substituted for them a rule that the peasants were to turn over their entire crop to the government and should retain for themselves only 31 pounds of grain per month for each member of the family. This naturally dissatisfied the peasants who had been won to the support of the new regime by the promises of the government that they could secure for their own use the land of the state and of the landlords. Each year, as the Soviets tried to enforce the collection, they planted less and less acreage and resorted to more skilful methods of hiding what they did produce in the hope that they might somehow exchange it for those manufactured products of which they were in urgent need.

To counterbalance this, the Russian detachments made more and more extensive raids and they were not satisfied to take merely the legal surplus. They seized everything in the way of food and supplies on which they could lay their hands and, in case of opposition, they ruthlessly shot the peasants without any trial or investigation as counter-revolutionists. In a sense they succeeded in their mission, for the food collectors in 1920 secured in Ukraine 2,560,000

[1] [Expropriation of landowners, distribution of land to peasants, 1919-21- Analyst]

tons of grain or about 75% of the total amount that they secured in the whole of the former Russian Empire. 651 661

This led to new clashes and with the suppression of the larger armed partisan bands, there grew up a new feeling of ugliness that boded ill for the security of the whole regime. The success of the Communists in the industrial centres was thus balanced by their failure to win over any substantial part of the rural population.

In the cities the new regime met with problems of another kind. The workers in the great coal and iron industry where Communism was strongest had at a very early date expelled the managers and foremen and had taken over themselves the operation of the plants, many of which had been ruined in the civil war. Now they found that they were not able to restore production. Industry practically came to a halt and by the end of 1921 there was only one blast furnace operating in Ukraine. The production of pig-iron dropped to 11,300 tons, or barely 3% of the pre-war production. The railroads suffered the same fate. There was no way of repairing them and without a trained administrative staff, they almost stopped functioning. This, in turn, increased unemployment and a lack of food in the cities and once more the city dwellers began to stream out into the country districts. 433 369 [327]

As a final blow there came in 1920 one of those periods of drought which have recurred sporadically in Ukraine throughout the centuries. In view of the general decay in transportation and the ravages of the war, this became serious and the situation grew even worse when the same phenomenon was repeated in 1921. Between the drought and the raiding detachments, the peasants had no reserves of grain and a famine broke out which cost the lives of several million Ukrainians. 731

This famine was very definitely the result of Communist mismanagement, plus the drought, but the Soviet regime was unable to take any effective counter-measures. When its extent was realized, the regime allowed through the League of Nations the organization of the American Relief Administration under Herbert Hoover. This collected and sent to the stricken areas large quantities of grain but it carried on its work with such impartiality that

1 [Ukrainian Soviet Republic established 1919 -- Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER FOUR

The New Economic Policy

With the cities prostrate, the land untilled and the people starving, not only in the Ukraine but elsewhere on Soviet-controlled territory, Lenin suddenly changed his policies and introduced various measures which rapidly relieved some of the most glaring defects of the Soviet system. The general term for the new arrangement is the New Economic Policy which more or less remained in force until 1929.

The basis of these measures was a change in the method of collecting taxes and income. Whereas, during the period of Militant Communism, the peasants had been compelled in theory to hand over their entire production to the state with the exception of what they were allowed to retain for their own personal use, they were now assigned a fixed amount which they were to contribute, and the balance they could retain or even sell in the local markets. The decree providing for this was signed March 21, 1921. This gave the peasants a new inspiration to work, for they could begin to make plans rationally and intelligently and could hope to receive some reward for their diligence and industry. This measure was supplemented by others which made it appear that the Bolshevik regime was in some degree returning to the philosophy or the practices of capitalism.

That was undoubtedly the impression that Lenin wanted to convey abroad. There had been signs that some of the European countries were willing to renew commercial relations with the Soviets, and the introduction of the New Economic Policy strengthened these desires. People began to speculate glibly and naively that the practical realities of existence had forced Lenin to admit much that he had previously denied and they predicted that in

423 474 661 425 policy was now changed and the middle and the richer peasants were grouped together and opposed to the poor peasants. This multiplied enormously the hostile and unsympathetic elements of the population but by holding out tempting offers to the poor peasants, the Communists succeeded in fanning anew the flames of class hatred in the villages and in producing the desired effects.

● [651] Along with the adoption of the Five Year Plan, the All-Union Congress called for the strengthening of attempts at collectivization. As a result, the amount of grain demanded and the amount of taxes were rapidly raised with the avowed purpose of ruining the kulaks and kurkuls, as they were called in Ukraine. Increased pressure was put upon all classes of the rural population to join collective farms and in some districts this was so effective that almost seventy per cent of the land was turned over for organization on a "voluntary" basis.

As a further step in the same direction there began in 1928 and also in 1929 a furious attack on the richer and middle peasants and a growing insistence on the need of "dekurkulizing" the villages. This meant nothing more or less than the elimination from the countryside of all those people who had prospered under the New Economic Policy. The property of the richer and more prosperous peasants was completely confiscated and they with their families were deprived of all their rights, often including the house where they had lived or the shacks into which they could crawl for shelter. With superb inhumanity the Bolsheviks would drive formerly wealthy peasants and their families from their homes in the middle of winter and leave them without food or clothing and would threaten any of their relatives or friends who dared to give them any relief.

In the first stages of the process, cases were known where some of these richer people were moved out of the Ukraine with their goods and cattle, but as the Communists settled down to their work, they simply seized everything for their own use and that of the collective farms and contented themselves with shooting or deporting their enemies, often to the far north for work in the

433 terms of percentages in reference to a prior date. Still the alreaa published data were so scanty and incomplete that it became increasingly more and more difficult to secure an actual picture of the progress in the Union as a whole and still more so in any of the separate Soviet Republics, for the central regime rarely broke down what little information it gave out among its constituent parts.

651 241 661 It was not long before another change was made in the methods of collecting the products from the collective farms. Under the new system, the farms did not contribute according to their crop but according to the amount of land which they proposed to sow. This amount was due to the government, even in those cases where there was a complete failure of the harvest not under the control of the workers. In other words, if a crop failed because of bad weather conditions, the peasants were compelled to hand over just as much produce as if they had had a bumper crop.

It can be easily seen that such a measure was merely another device for weakening the economic position of the village and the independence of the collective farm. At the same time the establishment of official tractor stations in place of the old locally controlled centres which sent crews and machines into the countryside gave the government another weapon for the exertion of pressure upon the peasants and even the Communists who were in charge of the farms and these crews likewise were paid not on the basis of their work but of the theoretical area which was to be sown. Later this was again changed to the total area of the farm whether it was suitable for any special kind of agriculture or not.

These measures only increased the discontent among the peasants who once again began to limit their work to the minimum necessary to maintain themselves on a steadily dropping scale of living. To counter-balance this the Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a decree in February, 1930 allowing the local authorities who were, of course, handpicked by Moscow to resort to extreme measures against the kurkuls, to confiscate their property and then to dispose of them by sending them and their families to concentration camps, to special settlements in the far north or eastern Asia or merely by expelling them from their home district.

1 [after establishing All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture, 1929 --Analyst]

These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651 ●
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown.. These were naturally the more 661
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had
profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some
capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw ma- 433
terials had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home
and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured
articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood.
This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were
too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants
were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to
rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods
were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole
point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as
rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing
that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It con-
centrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in
military preparations. Even when petitions were made by the
Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile
factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for
the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR.
Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transpor-
tation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that
were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932
they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step
was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 – 1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

651/685/241/511 missars issued a decree for the "protection of socialist property." Under this law the stealing of a single ear of grain from a kolhosp granary could be punished by confinement for ten years in a concentration camp. It was so interpreted that if a peasant picked up a single stalk from the field after the harvest, he was liable for the same punishment. In other words, the peasant could only secure his grain legally from and through the administration of the kolhosp.

With this law on the books, the Ukrainian collective farms could be punished either for failing to protect "socialist property" or they could be attacked for failing to present to the government crops and grain in an amount equal to that foreseen by the plan. This was the easier because there were few of the kolhosps that had been able to sow the area required of them. Lack of intelligent and competent leadership on the farms and the exigencies of the weather made it almost inevitable that there would be deficiencies, especially since the schedules were made up in Moscow and took no account of the local conditions.

As the grain deliveries lagged, the demands increased and on January 24, 1933, the Central Committee of the VKP/b issued a new resolution that "it was regarded as proved that the party organization of Ukraine had not carried out the tasks assigned to it in organizing grain deliveries and executing the grain plan."

To remedy this, the central authorities ordered the formation of political detachments in the machine tractor stations, "the chief basic tasks of which were the insuring of the unconditional and immediate execution by the kolhosps and their members of all their obligations to the state and especially the decisive struggle with the stealing of kolhosp property, the struggle with the manifestations of sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the sharing of the grain supplies and the meat products of the kolhosps."

The leaders of these detachments were given the obligation "to secure the constant lawful and accurate fulfilment of the laws of the Soviet government by administrative and criminal measures against the organizers of the stealing of Soviet property and the

sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the branch of village agriculture." 651 685

The machine tractor stations were staffed by men largely alien to the Ukrainian countryside. The more fanatical Communists were placed in these political detachments and were, in effect, told to supplement or replace the local administration in the exercise of pressure and terror upon both the heads and the members of the kolhosps. To aid them in their work Moscow sent to Ukraine a Russian Pavel Postyshev as a special plenipotentiary of the Central Committee with 7,000 party workers from the Russian Republic. 241 511

The work of these special "commissions" and "brigades" was marked by the utmost severity. They entered the villages, and made the most thorough searches of the houses and barns of every peasant. They dug up the earth, broke into the walls of buildings and the stoves in which the peasants tried to hide their last handfuls of food. They even in places took specimens of the fecal matter from the toilets in the effort to learn in that way by analysis whether the peasants had stolen government property and were eating grain. Wherever they found any, the peasants were severely punished, while the detachments carried off not only grain but everything edible.

The same reports came from every corner of Ukraine. "They requisitioned everything that could be eaten" was the report from the village of Zorich in the district of Poltava. In one village in the district of Odesa, "they collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram" and in other places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove. In at least one of these commissions, Molotov, then head of the Council of Ministers, took a personal part.

The natural result was a famine of unprecedented severity. The villages had been hungry in the autumn. After these searches commenced, they literally starved. An Englishman, M. Magridge, wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1933: "During a recent visit to Ukraine, I have seen a little of the war which the Soviet government is carrying on against the peasants. The fields were 731 661

[result of excessive grain requisitions in 1933 -- Analyst]

country for less populated districts in the east, while, on the slightest suspicions, whole families were deported, separated and exiled, and their places taken by people from other Soviet republics who were brought in to destroy the racial unity that formerly existed in the villages.

To appreciate the difficulties of the peasants on the collective farms, we must remember that the involved bureaucratic system had ample opportunities for extorting the grain for little or no payment. Thus the Motor Transport Stations which controlled all the machinery were supported by payments from the collective farms of grain and other products in kind and this usually approached 21.5% of the total yield, while the Stations took over 23% of the crop for the government. Another 15% was retained by the kolhosp for sowing and for various insurance funds that were prescribed by law and another 18% was kept for fodder and for the compensation of the full-time administrators. Thus, there was barely a quarter of the produce left to be distributed among the working population and this was the variable quantity since all of the payments and collections were based not on the actual harvest but on the harvest as planned by the central authorities. Thus, in the case of a bad harvest, the share allotted for distribution was the part that was cut and the government, so far as possible was provided with its expected supply.

This amount was divided among the individuals and families on the basis of the labor days which they had worked. In the beginning a labor day meant labor for a day, no matter how many hours of labor were required, but even before World War II, this simple definition was replaced by a specification that it covered a definite amount of work and it might very easily happen that a slow or poor workman would have to work more than one day to make a labor day. Thus, there was the possibility of still further exploitation of the workmen, who could not know accurately until the end of the year on what they could count.

There was also distributed, likewise in proportion to labor days, a certain sum of money which the kolhosp received from the government in return for the sale of grain over the amount col-

[1 after 1933 famine - - Analyst]

lected for the tax in kind. This was a negligible sum and the average member rarely received more than one ruble per labor day. This sum was, of course, insufficient to provide for the goods which the family needed to purchase, and since their share of the grain was rarely sufficient to feed them, their situation became hopeless, while of other products the individual received about one litre of oil, fifty kilograms of potatoes, thirty-five kilograms of fruit, and five-tenths kilograms of meat and fat.

The real significance of these figures is shown in the prices that were charged in the state stores.[1] There a kilogram of bread cost ninety kopecks, ten eggs brought eight rubles, a kilogram of beef twenty-four rubles, and a pair of boots four hundred and fifty rubles, while a farmer's suit of clothes cost five hundred rubles.

It made the peasant really dependent upon his individual plot of land if he was to secure any necessities.[1] This was far too small and its use was bound with many restrictions. Thus, no family was allowed to hold more than one cow and two calves, one sow, up to ten goats, an undefined number of chickens and up to twenty beehives. In the beginning it was possible for the peasant to secure a certain amount of food for these animals from the common store. He was allowed to retain the manure and it was thus possible for him to improve his own individual plot and thus to secure larger returns. It was a liberal application of such principles that had rendered possible the general improvement which was noticeable during the years 1934-6, when the government was endeavoring to make the system of collective farms workable.

It can be easily seen that the system of allowing individual incomes was based on a principle opposite that of the New Economic Policy, for it would require scarcely a legislative enactment to reduce these amounts while the New Economic Policy presented a norm of profit to the workers. Yet with each year, once the government was convinced of its success, it found it possible in various ways to tap this new source of income for its own purposes.

The favorite method was by taxation. Thus, by 1939 if we should assume that the average family received in cash four hun-

[1] [Ukraine - after 1933 famine -- Analyst]

dred and eighty karbovantsy, they would be required to pay twenty-two and a half karb. in taxes, twenty in rent, fifty as a special tax and they would be required to volunteer to take at least two hundred in government bonds.

Even this did not cover the total payments to the government. With its usual love of double-talk and subterfuge, the government, which controlled every branch of human activity in the USSR, talked of the establishment of socialism and levied indirect taxes on all transactions so that the actual cost to the villagers of any manufactured article was about three times what it cost the government as producer. The whole subject was carefully veiled as a state secret to protect the Soviet Union against capitalist intrigues but the unfortunate population were the unwilling contributors to this new order of life.

Under such conditions it is extremely difficult to pierce the veil of percentages as to cost and production and give a reliable estimate as to the amount of money received for the government or the relationship between the sums spent in maintaining the operation of the Moscow-controlled factories in Ukraine and the amount spent upon the needs of the population either individually, as families or as citizens of the UkSSR or of the UkSSR as a governmental unity within the Soviet sphere. From those figures which the Soviet has let out, it is possible to see that the yearly budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has run from 2½-5% of the budget of the USSR while the population has been at least 18% of the total population.

With the villages compelled to yield the last pound of grain, etc., that could be extracted by force, and receiving in return almost no manufactured goods, the position of the city workmen and the intelligentsia was little better. The wages of the workmen were always insufficient, the housing conditions were hardly endurable, and the only point of betterment was that the larger places and some of the plants especially favored by the regime received more manufactured goods of a poor quality and at a high price which the fortunate people might be able to secure.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

this taboo language. It was necessary if the whole theory of the USSR was not to fall by the wayside and the authorities in Moscow were becoming aware of the growing danger of Nazism.

They encouraged the writers, as Tychyna and Rylsky, to write narrative and other poems on themes of the old hostility of the Ukrainians to the Polish nobles and to stress the assistance which, in those ancient days, the Ukrainians had received from the Muscovite authorities. They fanned again the fires of the civil war when the Ukrainian Communists, backed by their Muscovite friends and masters, were warring against the Ukrainian National Republic and Petlyura.

In fact, during these fantastic years, Tychyna, Rylsky, Yanovsky and similar writers, as well as Korniychuk, found it easier to maintain their freedom by this fanning of Ukrainian chauvinism into flame than did those authors who, following the narrow interpretation of socialist realism, sought to trace the transformations in the contemporary life and the growth of confidence in the Russian ideas of industrialization and collectivization. Again and again these men were called to account for allowing their local and national sympathies to run away with them and to include descriptions which were perhaps nostalgic but which could be twisted in the perverse logic of the NKVD into hidden criticisms of the great Stalin, the leaders of the people, and the all-wise and beneficent rule of Moscow.

By 1939, the situation in the Ukraine had changed entirely from what it had been in 1929 when the first five year plan was getting under way. The salient features of the Ukrainian economic life had been destroyed. Yet Moscow was not yet satisfied.

Despite the increased taxation and the reduction in the income of the average dweller on a collective farm, the Communist Party demanded each year a larger part of the grain and of the cash income. The voluntary donations for the benefit of the armed forces were increased and steps were begun to demand taxes in kind from the returns which the peasants received from their individual plots. Thus a peasant was required to contribute so many eggs per year to the government, which did not concern itself as to

whether or not that peasant was raising hens. The government demanded its share of the manure from the private cattle and it made no difference as to whether or not the individual raised cattle.

At the same time the heads of the Communist Party sought high and wide for misuse of state property. Again and again they discovered that on collective farms the administration and the peasants were in agreement that the best way to allow some improvement in the general economic situation was to permit the peasant to cultivate and have the income from a slightly larger plot of land. The increased productivity in this way often more than covered the apparent use of state income from the operations of the farm but to the leaders of the Communist Party this was as severe an offence as was the failure to fulfil obligations, for it dared to question the superiority of the policy of collectivization. During 1939, the Party made strenuous efforts to stop such abuses and they even went further in urging and commanding a reduction in the individual allotments of land, which had been the only means of winning even a grudging approval of the Ukrainian peasants for the idea of collectivization.

Of course, with the outbreak of World War II there came a slight relaxation of this pressure, for Stalin and his friends apparently became aware that an excessive attack upon the peasantry might lead them to make common cause with the opponents of the Soviet Union. Yet, this relaxation of pressure was very slight during the years 1939-1941, when the alliance of Stalin and Hitler seemed to be firm and steady and when the Soviet Union was expanding in accordance with its own powers and its own intrigues. In all this the Ukraine remained aloof, closely guarded against the importation of new ideas and the population dragged on their weary existence, scarcely daring to dream that anything could happen to change their unhappy lot.

[1939 -- Analysis]

725 668 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A. had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrainians were loyal to the Soviet Union. This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army. [208] [186]

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West. [651]

728 648 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

there were 85% Russians and only 8% Ukrainians. With this election system the representatives of the peasants, the most numerous part of the Ukrainian population, made only 12,7% of the members of this Soviet Congress. Finance, national economy, railways, labour — concisely all foundations of the economic life of Ukraine — were concentrated in Moscow. All Ukrainian co-operative organisations were subordinated to Moscow. During 1920 Ukraine had to deliver to Russia 160 million of Pud of grain (1 Pud is 36 lbs.), 6 million Pud meat, 30 million Pud potatoes, 255 million eggs, big consignments of sugar, etc. The Russian Red Army made requisitions for its needs separately and confiscated in the last months of 1920 about 30 million Pud grain in Ukraine (*Collection of Reports of the Government of the USSR:* Kharkov 1921).

No wonder that in consequence of this exploitation the Urkrainian partisan movement was spreading. At the end of 1920 there were not less than 40,000 Ukrainian partisans in Ukraine who fought against the Russian Communists as an organised force. Evidence of the extent of this struggle is given to us in the trophies of the Soviet Russian troops seized in the war with the Ukrainian partisans 1920—21: 43 guns, 1,812 machine-guns, 31,788 rifles etc. (*Collection of Reports*). In the course of only one year, 1921, the Soviet Secret Police in Ukraine suppressed 6,000 partisan organisations. (*Communist:* Kharkov, February 11, 1923).

2. The Famine of 1921/22 and the Policy of Soviet Russia in Ukraine

The Soviet Russian Government took advantage of the horrible famine of 1921/22 in Ukraine and succeeded in strengthening its rule there. A drought in the fall of 1920 and spring 1921 was followed by a bad harvest, and a great dearth of food arose. A real famine began. However, the policy of the Russian Government in Ukraine, intending to get as much food as possible, did not change. Before the outside world the Russian authorities tried to hide the hunger catastrophe in Ukraine, and directed all foreign aid coming from America and Western Europe into Russia. Though in Ukraine in autumn 1921, millions of the Ukrainian population were starving the Russian Government, nevertheless, took away from the hungry regions the rest of the food stocks, and exported them to Russia. This roused the attention of foreigners who stayed at that time in Ukraine. The American historian H. H. Fisher writes in his book on the famine of 1921/22 that the representatives of the Soviet Russian Government demanded resolutely that it was

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but politically faithful to Moscow.

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists.

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others.

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commissar of Education in Ukraine from 1027—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the

439 destinations; and the barley chiefly to Germany. The iron-ore goes mainly to Great Britain and Germany.

(*b*) *Imports*

As in the case of exports, exact figures for the Ukraine imports cannot be given. In the long list of Russian imports, only three stand out conspicuously —raw cotton, wool, and machinery. Neither imported wool nor cotton is worked in the Ukraine, and the importation of agricultural machinery, though still considerable, is declining. As for commodities under the headings of colonial produce and manufactured goods, the share taken by the Ukraine cannot be estimated, but it is probable that more than half the amount imported through Ukraine ports is consumed beyond the Ukraine boundaries, as the adjacent parts of Russia have greater purchasing power. It may safely be said, however, that the imports of chemical manures, which are increasing rapidly, are largely destined for the Ukraine.

Germany is the principal source of Russia's imports, her share being usually 45–50 per cent. of their total value. Imports from Great Britain represent only 12–14 per cent. of the whole. The rest of the import trade is divided among many countries, none of which contributes as much as 10 per cent. of the total.

(*c*) *Customs and Tariffs*

● 651 The Russian tariff is on the whole highly protective, particularly in reference to manufactured articles. As far as possible the duties are levied on weight, only occasionally on value. The tariff contains 218 sections and many sub-classifications.

There is a short free list which includes many kinds of agricultural machinery, live cattle, horses, and cattle food consisting of by-products of manufacture. Certain fertilizing substances and chemicals necessary for tanning and other industries are imported under low duties.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The conventional tariff is modified in favour of various nations in respect of specified items according to the commercial treaties mentioned below. 651

(*d*) *Commercial Treaties*

The Ukraine having hitherto formed part of the Russian Empire, the commercial treaties of the Empire have had full force there. Up to the year 1893, notwithstanding any treaties existing, all European nations were on the same footing in relation to the Russian tariff. Since then the following special conventions as to tariffs have been concluded: 648 439

With France.—A treaty of 1893 provides for a reduction of Russian duties on 52 articles of French origin, in exchange for a reduced French tariff on naphtha and its products.

With Serbia.—A treaty of commerce and navigation, signed in 1893, agrees to a decrease of the Russian duty on Serbian fruits, in exchange for Serbian concessions on fish and mineral oils.

With Germany.—By a treaty of commerce signed in 1894, Russia lowered her duties in favour of Germany on 135 articles, in consideration of which she obtained most-favoured-nation treatment from Germany.

With Portugal.—A general convention of 1895 arranged that Russia should benefit by certain reductions of the Portuguese tariff, and that Portuguese cork and cork products should be allowed a 20 per cent. reduction of duty on entering Russia.

With Japan.—A general treaty, signed in 1895, placed Japan, in respect of her commercial relations with Russia, on a similar footing to that of European countries.

With Bulgaria.—In 1897 the Russian tariff on dried meat, eggs, and undressed leather was lowered in favour of Bulgaria, and attar of roses was admitted free of duty. In return, certain general concessions and most-favoured-nation treatment were accorded by Bulgaria to Russia.

S: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

In 1910 the revenue receipts from the respective Governments of the Ukraine were as follows: 652

	Roubles.
Volhynia	24,400,000
Podolia	24,300,000
Kiev	128,900,000
Chernigov	18,400,000
Poltava	24,900,000
Kharkov	46,200,000
Yekaterinoslav	37,300,000
Kherson	80,400,000
Taurida	12,800,000
Total	397,600,000

The total revenue of European Russia for the same year was 1,522,800,000 roubles. In the period 1906–10 the revenue showed a good expansion in the Governments of Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, and Kherson. Elsewhere in the Ukraine it appeared to be stationary.

After the Imperial authorities, the *zemstvos* are the most important bodies authorized to raise taxes. Their revenue comes from taxes on land, houses, and factory buildings, and from licences for distilleries, 69 per cent. being derived from the land tax. Their expenses are (1) obligatory: local civil administration, upkeep of district roads, bridges, &c., and health service; (2) facultative: public instruction and provision of medical attendance in rural districts. Their functions have gradually spread in a somewhat irregular manner, and vary very much according to the degree of energy shown by the committees. Some have embarked on commercial schemes, such as the installation of telephone systems or trade in agricultural machinery; others perform only the minimum of their duties. 651 652 634

Five Governments of the Ukraine have a *zemstvo* organization, and their budgets of receipts and expenses, which appear to balance exactly, are as follows for the years 1906 and 1910: 652 634

Government.	1906. *Roubles.*	1910. *Roubles.*
Yekaterinoslav . .	5,210,000	8,241,000
Poltava . . .	6,737,000	8,750,000
Taurida . . .	3,599,000	4,576,000
Kharkov . . .	5,753,000	9,168,000
Kherson . . .	3,808,000	5,542,000

Thirty-one towns in the Ukraine have municipal administrations, and can raise taxes and contract loans for purposes similar to those of the *zemstvo* budgets. A considerable debt has been incurred. The towns of Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa have borrowed money for municipal purposes in foreign markets; of a total debt of 53,000,000 roubles, these three towns account for 35,000,000 roubles.

The *mirs* or local communes can also raise some taxes for purely local purposes. Obligatory taxes are levied for local communal administration, provision of granaries for storing food-stuffs, upkeep of local roads on peasant lands, and insurance against fire and inundations. Facultative powers of taxation are in the hands of the *mirs* for the building and maintenance of churches, schools, and hospitals, and other special local needs. There is a great deal of irregularity in the levying and administration of these taxes.

(2) Banking

The banks of the Ukraine fall into several well-defined groups. In the first place come banks which are State or semi-State institutions. These are the Imperial State Bank, the Land Bank of the Nobility, the Peasants' Land Bank, and the State Savings Bank.

The Imperial State Bank is a Government institution with a wide sphere of activity. It controls the currency and note issue, being the only bank issuing notes. It undertakes general banking and bill broking, besides having close relations with the Treasury for revenue, loan, and other purposes. It makes large loans to private banks; up to 1910 the total amount was £189,000,000. It also advances money on merchandise, principally on